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Abstract:  
We develop a model of a competitive rental housing market with an endogenous rate 
of tenancy default arising from income uncertainty. Potential tenants must choose to 
engage in a costly search for rental housing, and must commit to a rental agreement 
before the uncertainty is resolved. We show that there are two possible equilibria in 
this market : a market-clearing equilibrium and an equilibrium with excess demand. 
Therefore, individuals might not have access to rental housing because they are 
unable to afford to look for housing, they are unable to pay their rent, or with excess 
demand in the market they are simply unable to find a rental unit. We show that 
government regulations affecting the cost of default to the housing suppliers and the 
quality of rental units can have different effects on the equilibrium variables of interest 
– rental rate, quantity demanded and supplied, and access to rental housing – 
depending on the type of equilibria in the market. A numerical example illustrates 
these results. 
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1. Introduction
Over the past few years public attention has increasingly focused on the issue of ‘affordable housing’.
Generally housing is considered affordable if the household spends less than 30% of its gross income
on housing costs (rent and/or mortgage and associated operating costs, such as, utilities, water,
heat, etc.). Concern over the lack of access to affordable housing, in particular for low income
households, has been the driving force behind this increased attention. The basis for this concern
lies in the following observations. First, lower income households are more likely to rent than
higher income households. In 2001, almost two thirds of households in the bottom 20% of the
income distribution were renters versus one third of middle-income households and only 10% of
households at the top of the income distribution (Canadian Housing Observer, 2006). Further, the
likelihood that a rental household spends more than 30% of their gross income on rental housing
is significantly higher for rental households at the lower end of the income distribution. In 2001,
70% of low-income rental households spent more than 30% of their gross income on housing costs
whereas less than 5% of middle and high income households did. Similar observations have been
documented in the United States by Quigley and Raphael (2004). They also show that there has
been a steady decline in the proportion of affordable rental housing stock for the median income
rental household in the U.S. over the past thirty years. These observations point to both an
undersupply of affordable rental housing as well as inequities in rental burdens, with the greatest
burden falling on the poorest households.
There are various possible explanations for the lack of affordable rental housing. One expla-
nation is simply that the income of rental households has declined.1 Other explanations for the
undersupply of rental housing rely on some form of government intervention. For example, Quigley
and Raphael (2004) argue that reductions in the amount of affordable housing in the 1980s and
1990s in the U.S. were due to increased rental prices that resulted from increased quality of rental
housing driven by government building standards. Price regulations and other forms of rent control
that restrict rental price could also generate excess demand in the rental housing market. Other
government regulations such as land-use or zoning regulations could also inhibit the development
of new construction and thereby cause an undersupply of rental housing (Arnott, 1995).
In this paper, we examine another possible explanation for the undersupply of rental housing
– tenancy default. For households at the bottom of the income distribution, the lack of access to
financial means could be a very binding constraint. As noted in the Canadian Housing Observer
(2006): ”Due to their limited incomes, low- and moderate-income households face greater challenges
in addressing their housing needs and in balancing housing costs against other household expenses.”
Such households may face a very real risk of defaulting on their rent and being evicted from
their homes. The evidence on actual rental housing evictions is somewhat limited as there is no
1 Quigley and Raphael (2004) argue that this income decline could explain most of the reduction in the
stock of affordable rental housing in the US during the 1970s but cannot explain any later decline.
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central registry for maintaining such information. Most of the evidence on evictions comes from
case-studies and court records. Often the evictions that are documented are those that were the
outcome of a forceful eviction in which a court-order was issued. Of course, some tenants might
choose to voluntarily leave their homes before being forcefully removed and thus the evidence on
evictions might understate the true number of evictions (Hartmann and Robinson, 2003). There
are generally three reasons a tenant might be legally evicted; rent arrears, engaging in some form
of anti-social behaviour, and renovation or conversion of rental unit to an alternative use. The
majority of evictions fall into the first category (CMHC, 2005). For example, in Montreal close to
85% of all complaints filed by landlords cite non-payment of rent as the reason for the complaint
(UN-Habitat Urban Indicators, 2005). Further, this study indicates that an eviction ratio of about
3% of the rental stock is standard for most Canadian cities. Such evictions are costly for both the
tenant and the landlord, and may also have long term social costs.
We argue that the risk of default for households could explain the lack of access to rental
housing even with a perfectly competitive rental market.2 To show this, we build a model of a
perfectly competitive rental housing market in which individuals may not have access to a rental
unit for three reasons: First, individuals face some income uncertainty and must commit to a
housing decision before this uncertainty is resolved. As such, once their final income is known,
some individuals who have found a rental unit will be unable to pay their rent and will be evicted.
Second, some individuals may face a prohibitive cost of searching for a rental unit. Third, there
may be excess demand in the rental housing market even though the rental market is perfectly
competitive. Increasing supply to eliminate the excess demand (or, equivalently increasing the
rental price) would increase the average probability of default in the rental housing market. It
may therefore be in the interest of each competitive supplier not to increase supply and to keep
rental prices below the market-clearing level. As a result, some individuals who choose to look
for a rental unit will be unable to find one. Having shown that tenancy default can generate an
equilibrium with excess demand, we then examine the impact of government policies on the housing
market. As it turns out, changes in government policies (e.g. regulation on the quality of housing
or regulation impacting on the cost of default for the housing suppliers) may well exacerbate the
problem of the lack of affordable housing. We also explain how the same government policies can
have significantly different effects when the economy rests in a an equilibrium with excess demand
as opposed to in a standard market clearing equilibrium.
That competitive suppliers may find it in their interest to charge an efficiency price different
from the market-clearing price was established, among others, by Weiss (1980), Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981), and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The paper which is the closest to ours is Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) in which it is shown that banks may prefer to keep interest rates on loans at a low level to
avoid attracting only high-risk borrowers. In our paper, a similar “sorting” effect is also present,
2 Basu and Emerson (2003) also develop a model of excess demand for rental housing. In their model,
however, there are monopolistic landlords, no tenancy default and some forms of rent control.
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but it works in the opposite direction for firms (landlords): by charging a low rent, firms reduce
the probability of default for a given set of tenants, but they also worsen the pool of tenant as
lower rents attract relatively poorer tenants. Our analysis also differs from Stiglitz and Weiss by
focusing on the rental housing market, which allows us to build a rich model with several housing
specific ingredients. Finally, as will be shown, in our analysis the level of excess demand affects
demand and supply, a phenomenon which is absent in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).3 As we show,
the responses of demand and supply to excess demand is important in establishing the impact of
policies on key variables of interest.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: The next section outlines our model of the rental
housing market. We characterize the types of equilibria arising in this market in Section 3. We then
examine the effect of changes in the various parameters on the equilibrium variables of interest
in Section 4, and on social welfare in Section 5. In Section 6, we present numerical examples
illustrating the two types of equilibria arising in the model as well as some comparative static
results. Section 7 briefly concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a world populated with a continuum of individuals extracting utility v from the consump-
tion of housing H and of some composite good c. Utility is given by
v(H, c) = u(H) + g(c)
with u′ > 0 ≥ u′′, g(c) = c for c ≥ co, and g(c) = −∞ for c < co where co ≥ 0 is some minimal
consumption level of the composite good needed for survival.4 Utility v is assumed to be bounded
below for non-negative levels of housing, that is, v(H, c ≥ co) ≥ v > −∞, ∀ H ≥ 0. It follows
that in choosing their consumption bundle all individuals ensure that c ≥ co. Individuals differ
in terms of ex ante income y which is assumed to be distributed on [y, y] with y > 0 according
to the cumulative distribution G(y) with density G′(y) = g(y) > 0 for all y. Total population is
normalized to unity. Final or ex post income is uncertain. Ex ante income is affected by an i.i.d.
shock s drawn from the cumulative distribution F (s) with density F ′(s) = f(s) > 0 for all s, unit
mean E(s) = 1, and support [s, s] with s > 0. Thus, post-shock final income of an individual with
ex ante income y who has drawn shock s is simply sy, so expected income is E(sy) = y. We assume
that this income shock is uninsurable.5
3 Note that in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), labour supply (effort) depends on excess supply (unemploy-
ment). However, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is a moral hazard model while our model and that of
Stiglitz and Weiss are adverse selection models.
4 Assuming separability simplifies the analysis but the same qualitative results should be obtained
without separability provided vcH > 0.
5 As we are considering individuals at the bottom of the income distribution, we think it is reasonable
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Individuals must decide whether to look for rental housing. Rental housing can only be
consumed in a single discrete amount h. Individuals who do not have access to a rental unit either
because they did not look for housing, couldn’t not find any, or defaulted on their rent receive a
level of housing ho ≥ 0 which is strictly less than h and is costless.6 Therefore, H ∈ {ho, h} with
h > ho ≥ 0. The actual value of rental housing h represents both quality features, such as location
and state of disrepair, and quantity features, such as square footage, of the rental unit. In what
follows, we will assume that the government, through regulation, can affect the actual value of h.
Indeed, as was often done in the past in Canada or in the U.S., a government can increase the
value of h by introducing modifications to the construction or building code.
The price of rental housing or rent is denoted by r and the price of the composite good is
unity (that is, c is the numeraire). There is a fixed utility cost of looking for housing denoted
by k > 0 which could be interpreted as the time it takes to look for housing.7 If individuals
search for a rental unit and are successful in finding one, then they must sign a lease before shock
s is realized (i.e. before income uncertainty is resolved). We assume that there is no voluntary
default, that is, we assume that the difference between u(h) and u(ho) is large enough so that
u(h)− k + sy − r > u(ho)− k + sy or u(h)− r > u(ho).8 Individuals only default ex post because
they are forced to. For individuals who find rental housing and are lucky enough to draw a good
shock (i.e. those for which sy ≥ r+ co), there is no need to adjust H and the final consumption of
c is ex post income minus spending on housing: c = sy− r, so final utility is v = u(h)− k+ sy− r.
However, some individuals draw a bad shock and have to default ex post on their rent to ensure
that they satisfy c ≥ co. This happens if sy < r + co. In this case, H is revised to ho, final
consumption is c = sy and final utility is v = u(ho) − k + sy.9 The worst shock s is assumed to
to assume these individuals have limited access to the financial means to self-insure against adverse
income shocks, that is, we assume they have no savings and lack the means to borrow money. Adverse
income shocks could reflect loss of employment income due to injury or illness, increases in the price
of necessities, or the loss of income from a supporting person or government program. Some of these
adverse shocks may be publicly insured but there are often waiting times before benefits are received
and it is during these times of no benefit payments that default could occur.
6 This alternative housing could be living with family/friends, in a shelter or on the street. The utility
derived from such housing would obviously depend on the specific alternative.
7 Incorporating a positive search cost generates an elastic demand for housing. Without this positive
search cost, demand for rental housing would be completely inelastic. An alternative way to generate
elastic demand would be to allow for a secondary rental housing market with rental units of higher
quality/quantity. Having rental units of differing quality, however, would greatly complicate the
analysis without changing the possibility of a market equilibrium with excess demand. Another way
to generate elastic demand would be to assume that there is some utility cost from defaulting on one’s
rent. In this case, both demand and supply would be independent of excess demand in the market
but an equilibrium with excess demand could still be obtained.
8 Also note that there is no moral hazard: individuals cannot affect the value of shock s that they draw.
9 We assume that both ex ante income y and ex post shock s are private information so re-negotiation
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be large enough so that co can always be purchased yet not so large as to preclude the possibility
that any individual may default on their rent.10
It is possible that there will be excess demand in the rental market. If there is excess demand,
then we assume that rental units are allocated randomly according to a pure Bernouilly mechanism.
Let µ denote the probability that an individual will not be allocated a rental unit given that he
has opted to look for housing. This probability will be equal to the proportion of total demand for
rental housing that is not met in equilibrium, i.e. the ratio of excess demand for rental housing
divided by the total demand for rental housing. In other words, µ is determined endogenously in
equilibrium. If there is market-clearing then µ will be zero in equilibrium. If there is excess demand
in the rental housing market then µ will be positive. Those that look for housing or demand rental
housing, but are unsuccessful at obtaining a rental unit, simply end up consuming ho and receive
final utility u(ho)− k + sy.
On the other side of the market, there are M housing suppliers where we normalize M to
unity so there is a representative entrepreneur who produces housing units. It is assumed that
both ex ante income y and final income sy are unobservable, so there can only be one price in the
market, which is charged to all tenants. The distribution of income and the distribution of shocks
is known, so the average probability of default in the rental housing market is also known to the
representative supplier. The representative supplier takes both this average probability of default
and the rental price as given and chooses the number of units of housing to produce, denoted by n,
that maximizes expected profits. The total cost of producing n units of housing of quality/quantity
h is hC(n), where C ′ > 0, C ′′ ≥ 0. The timing of events is as follows:
1. Taking the rental price as given, individuals decide whether to look for rental housing and the
representative housing supplier chooses the number of rental units to supply.
2. Equilibrium in the housing market: Rental price is determined, and the rental housing market
may or may not clear.
3. Income shock is realized and individuals who succeeded in finding a place will default if
sy < co + r.
2.1 Demand Side of the Rental Housing Market
An individual with ex ante income y must decide whether to look for a rental unit. If he chooses
of the rent ex post is not possible, even if that would be beneficial for the owner and the tenant. It is
likely that such information is difficult and costly to observe.
10 The worst shock s is such that the poorest ex post individual will always be able to afford co: sy ≥ co
and the individual will the highest ex ante income who receives this shock will default on their rent:
sy < co + r.
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to look for a rental unit and finds one, then he will default on his rent if sy < co + r, or if
s < co + r
y
≡ sˆ(r, y, co) (1)
where
sˆr(r, y, co) =
1
y
> 0, sˆy(r, y, co) = −
sˆ
y
< 0, sˆc(r, y, co) =
1
y
> 0, (2)
and he will not default if s ≥ sˆ(r, y, co).
An individual’s expected utility if he looks for rental housing is given by:
vh =(1− µ)
{∫ sˆ(r,y,co)
s
[u(ho)− k + sy]dF +
∫ s
sˆ(r,y,co)
[u(h)− k + sy − r]dF
}
+ µ
{∫ s
s
[u(ho)− k + sy]dF
} (3)
If he chooses not to look for rental housing, then his expected utility is given by:
vo =
∫ s
s
[u(ho) + sy]dF = u(ho) + y (4)
Therefore, an individual with a given expected income y will look for rental housing if vh − vo ≥ 0
or if
(1− µ)[1− F (sˆ(r, y, co))][u(h)− r − u(ho)]− k ≥ 0 (5)
We assume there exists some income level in [y, y) such that the expected utility differential between
looking and not looking for rental housing is equal to zero, vh−vo = 0. Denote this level of income
by yˆ(r, µ,x) where we use the summary notation x = {co, k, h}. Differentiating the expected utility
differential with respect to y yields:
∂(vh − vo)
∂y = (1− µ)[u(h)− r − u(ho)]f(sˆ)
sˆ
y > 0 (6)
It follows from (6) that all individuals with y ≥ yˆ(r, µ,x) will look for rental housing and all
individuals with y < yˆ(r, µ,x) will not search for rental housing. Total demand for rental housing
will be given by D(r, µ,x) = 1−G(yˆ(r, µ,x)) and will depend on the endogenous variables {r, µ}
and the exogenous parameters {co, k, h}. We can now obtain the following partial derivatives (see
Appendix for details):
yˆr > 0, yˆµ > 0, yˆco > 0, yˆk > 0, yˆh < 0 (7)
Dr < 0, Dµ < 0, Dco < 0, Dk < 0, Dh > 0 (8)
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***INSERT Figure 1: Market Demand HERE***
As shown in Figure 1, market demand is decreasing in the rental price. The market demand
curve will shift in response to changes in the other parameters, co, k, and h. In particular, for a
given rental rate, individuals are less likely to look for housing, the more income they need for con-
sumption to survive, the more costly it is to search for housing, and the lower the quality/quantity
of the rental housing units. In other words, the demand curve will shift down with an increase in
co, and k, and a decrease in h. Market demand also depends negatively on the probability that
an individuals finds rental housing if they search for rental housing, µ. The value of this variable,
together with the rental price, is determined in equilibrium but it is instructive to note that for a
given rental rate, an increase in µ will shift the demand curve down as shown in Figure 1.
2.2 Supply Side of the Rental Housing Market
To solve the problem of the representative housing supplier, we need to first establish the default
rate in the rental market. To do this, we simply have to work out the average probability of default
of those individuals who demand rental housing which we denote by pi. This average probability of
default can be obtained by summing up the probability of default for all individuals who demand
rental housing and dividing by the total demand for rental housing. Doing this, we have:
pi(r, µ,x) = 1
[1−G(yˆ(r, µ,x))]
∫ y
yˆ(r,µ,x)
∫ sˆ(r,co,y)
s
dFdG
=
1
[1−G(yˆ(r, µ,x))]
∫ y
yˆ(r,µ,x)
F
(
co + r
y
)
dG (9)
Differentiating (9), we obtain
pir = A+Byˆr, pico = A+Byˆco , piµ = Byˆµ < 0, pik = Byˆk < 0, pih = Byˆh > 0 (10)
where
A = 1
1−G(yˆ)
∫ y
yˆ
f
(
co + r
y
)
1
y dG > 0
B = g(yˆ)
[1−G(yˆ)]2
[∫ y
yˆ
F
(
co + r
y
)
dG− F
(
co + r
yˆ
)
(1−G(yˆ))
]
< 0.
A change in either r or co has both a direct effect and an indirect or selection effect on the
average probability of default. These two effects work in opposite directions. The direct effect,
denoted by A, is positive. An increase in r or co increases the probability of default for a given set
of tenants. The indirect or selection effect works through changes in the demand for rental housing
or in the set of individuals looking for rental housing, yˆ. The higher is yˆ, the higher is the average
income of those looking for rental housing and the lower the average probability of default as given
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by B. An increase in r or co reduces the demand for rental housing or increases yˆ. Any change in
µ, k, and h only has an indirect effect on the average probability of default. An increase in µ and
k, or a decrease in h reduces the demand for housing or increases yˆ. Thus, the changes in these
parameters have an unambiguous effect on the average probability of default.
The interesting case we consider in this paper is the one in which the direct effect on the
average probability of default of an increase in the rental price dominates the selection effect.11
In this case, the average probability of default will be increasing in both the rental price and the
minimum consumption level.12 We assume the following for the remainder of the paper:
Assumption 1: pir > 0 (10)
The representative supplier in the perfectly competitive rental housing market takes the rental
price and average probability of default as given. Let z > 0 be the cost of having a tenant default
on their rent.13 This could be interpreted as time and/or money cost of evicting tenants, and
in what follows, we assume that the government can influence this cost through housing market
regulations, for example, by lengthening the procedure for eviction. The supplier’s expected profit
is given by:
nR(r, µ,m)− hC(n) (11)
where
R(r, µ,m) = r − pi(r, µ,x)(r + z) (12)
is the supplier’s effective or expected revenue per rental unit and in which we use summary notation
m = {co, k, h, z}. Differentiating (12) and using (10), we obtain the following:14
Rr(r, µ,m) = (1− pi)− (r + z)pir, Rµ(r, µ,m) > 0,
Rco(r, µ,m) < 0, Rk(r, µ,m) > 0, Rh(r, µ,m) < 0, Rz(r, µ,m) < 0.
(13)
With the possibility of default, the marginal expected unit revenue with respect to the rental
rate, Rr, can be positive or negative. A higher rental price increases rental revenue by 1−pi but it
also increases the likelihood that tenants will default on their rent by pir, in which case the supplier
11 If the average probability of default was decreasing in the rental rate, then expected revenue per
rental unit would always be increasing in the rental rate and there would never be an equilibrium
with excess demand. Housing suppliers would always want r to be as large as possible.
12 The assumption that pir > 0 is sufficient to ensure that pico > 0 since yˆr > yˆco as shown in the
appendix.
13 It is possible that z is less than zero so housing suppliers recover some portion of the rent from tenants
who default. In this case, we would have to account for where this money is coming from.
14 The expressions for the remaining partial derivatives are given in the appendix.
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does not receive any rental income and has to incur an additional cost of z. The net effect on
expected revenue is ambiguous. An increase in the probability of not finding a rental unit, µ, has
a positive effect on expected revenue per rental unit since an increase in µ reduces the demand
for rental housing and thereby reduces the average probability of default for a given rental price.
This effect is illustrated in Figure 2. The remaining parameters also affect expected unit revenue
through their effect on the set of individuals demanding rental housing and therefore on the average
probability of default. The signs of these partial derivatives are as one would expect.
We assume that there exists a unique rental price, denoted by r˜(µ,m), such that the marginal
expected revenue per rental unit is exactly equal to zero. That is,
Rr(r˜, µ,m) ≡ (1− pi(r˜, µ,x))− (r˜ + z)pir(r˜, µ,x) = 0 (14)
where it is assumed that for all r
Rrr(r˜, µ,m) = −2pir − (r˜ + z)pirr < 0 (15)
so expected unit revenue is strictly concave in the rental price.15 This implies that for r < r˜,
Rr > 0, and for all r > r˜, Rr < 0, as shown in Figure 2.
***INSERT Figure 2: Expected Revenue Per Rental Unit HERE ***
Any change in the probability of not finding a rental unit, µ, will affect the rental price that
maximizes the supplier’s expected revenue per rental unit. To see this, differentiate (14) with
respect to µ to obtain
r˜µ(µ,m) =
−Rrµ
Rrr
=
piµ + (r˜ + z)pirµ
Rrr
. (16)
The greater the probability of not finding housing (higher µ), the more costly it is to look for a
rental unit and the average income of those looking for a house will be higher. This drives down the
probability of default and increases the marginal expected unit revenue. Given Rrr < 0, expected
revenue will be maximized at a higher rental price as given by the first term in the numerator
of (16). At the same time, the higher probability of not finding a house affects the marginal
probability of default with respect to the rental rate, pir, as given by the second term in (16). The
sign of this effect is not clear and we are unable to sign (16). We therefore make the following
assumption as indicated in Figure 2.16
15 Of course, it is possible that there is a unique, global maximizer of R without having R being strictly
concave. The key fact that marginal revenue, Rr, can be both positive and negative and therefore
market supply can be increasing and decreasing in the rental rate will still hold.
16 This assumption is not crucial for our main results. Alternatively, we could assume that r˜µ(µ,m) < 0.
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Assumption 2: r˜µ(µ,m) > 0
The representative supplier chooses the number of rental units to supply that maximize ex-
pected profits given by (11). The first-order condition is
R(r, µ,m)− hC ′(n) = 0 (17)
which yields the supplier’s (or market) supply n(r, µ,m).17
To determine how market supply is affected by the various parameters, we can totally differ-
entiate the first-order condition (17) to obtain the following partial derivatives which are given in
the appendix.
nr(r, µ,m) =
Rr
hC ′′(n)
><0, nµ(r, µ,m) > 0, nco(r, µ,m) < 0,
nk(r, µ,m) > 0, nh(r, µ,m) < 0, nz(r, µ,m) < 0.
(18)
Whether the supply curve is upward or downward sloping in the rental price will depend on
whether the expected unit revenue is increasing or decreasing in the rental rate. Given the assumed
properties of the expected unit revenue function, the rental housing supply curve will be upward-
sloping for all r < r˜ and backwards-bending for all r > r˜. In other words, the supply curve will be
shaped like a backwards ‘C’ with the maximum supply at r = r˜, as shown in Figure 3.
*****INSERT Figure 3: Market Supply HERE ********
Changes in the (endogenous) probability of not finding a rental unit, µ, and the various other
exogenous parameters will shift the market supply of rental housing. Increases in µ or k make it
more costly to look for housing so only those with higher incomes will look for rental units. The
average probability of default will be lower and the supplier’s expected revenue per rental unit will
be higher giving the supplier incentive to produce more rental units (for a given r). Therefore, an
increase in either µ, or the search cost, k, will shift the supply curve outwards. For illustrative
purposes, this is shown for a change in µ in Figure 3. An increase in h will have the opposite
effect and will shift market supply inwards. A change in the quality of rental units has a direct
negative effect (for a given r) on the supplier’s profits. Increases in h increase the cost of producing
rental units and reduce the expected revenue per rental unit by inducing lower income individuals
to demand rental housing and thereby increasing the average probability of default. A higher cost
of default z will shift market supply inwards since it directly reduces expected revenue per rental
unit. Likewise, a higher co reduces expected unit revenue since it increases the average probability
of default and therefore shifts the supply curve inwards for a given r.
17 The second-order condition is given by −hC′′(n) < 0, and is satisfied for a maximum.
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3. Market Equilibria
In general, there are two possible types of equilibria in this model. An equilibrium with excess
demand in which the demand for rental units exceeds the supply of rental units and, a market-
clearing equilibrium in which the supply of rental units exactly equals the demand for rental units.
We consider each in turn.
We first show that there may exist a rental price compatible with competitive behaviour (i.e.
such that firms have no incentive to charge another price) and with excess demand (µ > 0). This
rental price will be given by r˜(µ,m) for an appropriate equilibrium µ. To save on notation, we
suppress x and m and write demand as D(r, µ), supply as n(r, µ), expected revenue per unit as
R(r, µ), and the expected revenue (per unit) maximizing rental rate as r˜(µ). We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: If demand D(r, µ) lies above supply n(r, µ) when µ = 0, or if, for µ = 0, de-
mand D(r, µ) crosses supply n(r, µ) at a rental price greater than r˜(0), then there is a competitive
equilibrium with excess demand.
Proof: To prove the above Proposition, consider the case in which demand and supply cross at
rˇ > r˜(0), implying, graphically, that rˇ is on the decreasing right-hand side portion of the R(r, 0)
mountain.18 It follows that there is excess demand at r˜(0), i.e. D(r˜(0), 0) > n(r˜(0), 0). As
discussed above, we focus (without loss of generality) on the case in which r˜ is increasing in µ,
i.e. that for which r˜µ(µ) > 0. We are then interested in any µ > 0 such that r˜(0) < r˜(µ) < rˇ.
Hence, for any such µ > 0, the expected revenue per housing unit R(r, µ) is decreasing in r for all
r > r˜(µ). Now pick some r¯ such that r˜(µ) < r¯ < rˇ and let n(r¯, µ) = argmaxn nR(r¯, µ) − hC(n).
Then, for some
no = R(r¯, µ)R(r˜(µ), µ)n(r¯, µ) < n(r¯, µ),
we have
noR(r˜(µ), µ)− hC(no) = n(r¯, µ)R(r¯, µ)− hC(no) > n(r¯, µ)R(r¯, µ)− hC(n(r¯, µ))
where the inequality follows from no < n(r¯, µ). So competitive firms are better off producing no
rental units at r˜(µ) then any number of rental units at r¯ > r˜(µ).
Of course, if the rental price is r˜(µ), then each firm supplies n(r˜(µ), µ)=argmaxn nR(r˜(µ), µ)
−hC(n). Thus, by definition, we have
n(r˜(µ), µ)R(r˜(µ), µ)− hC(n(r˜(µ), µ)) ≥ noR(r˜(µ), µ)− hC (no) > n(r¯, µ)R(r¯, µ)− hC(n(r¯, µ))
18 The case in which demand is fully above supply when µ = 0 is straightforward.
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Charging a price r˜(µ) lower than rˇ is therefore consistent with competitive firm behaviour because
it entails a larger expected unit return and therefore, larger expected profits.
Finally, an equilibrium with excess demand is given by some positive level of µ, denoted by µ˜
such that:
(1− µ˜)D(r˜(µ˜), µ˜)− n(r˜(µ˜), µ˜) = 0 (19)
where µ˜ is the equilibrium probability that someone looking for a house does not find one given
excess demand in the rental housing market and in which all firms charge price r˜(µ˜) < rˇ. Note
that given r˜(µ) is increasing in µ, the left-hand side of the equilibrium condition (19) is strictly
decreasing in µ for all µ > 0, so that there should be some µ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that the above condition
(19) is exactly satisfied.19 This completes the proof.20
***INSERT Figure 4a: Excess Demand Equilibrium HERE ***
An excess demand equilibrium is represented in Figure 4a. In equilibrium, the rental rate is
r˜(µ˜), quantity supplied is n(r˜(µ˜), µ˜), and quantity demanded is D(r˜(µ˜), µ˜). In Figure 4a, supply
and demand (when µ = 0) cross at rˇ where supply is downward sloping. While demand and
supply clear at rˇ, this rent level is not an equilibrium. This is because any housing supplier (our
representative supplier) charging a lower rent ∈ [r˜(0), rˇ[ would be able to attract tenants and earn
larger profits. Thus, when supply and demand cross above r˜(0), that is, when the market supply
curve is downward-sloping, all suppliers would optimally deviate from rˇ and in equilibrium, the
rental housing market would move to the excess demand equilibrium (r˜(µ˜), µ˜).
For there to be a market-clearing equilibrium so that µ = 0 and anyone looking for a rental
housing unit will find one, the equilibrium rental price r∗ defined by
D(r∗, 0) = n(r∗, 0) (20)
19 For the case in which r˜(µ) is decreasing in µ, a sufficient (non-necessary) condition for excess demand
(i.e. the left-hand side of equation (19)) to be decreasing in µ is that the direct effect of an increase
of µ on excess demand (i.e. (1−µ)Dµ−nµ) outweighs the indirect effect of the increase in µ through
r˜ (i.e. [(1− µ)Dr − nr]r˜µ).
20 The above proof is similar in nature to the argument presented in Weiss (1980). Weiss showed that
if the expected revenue from hiring a working is an increasing function of the wage, then competitive
firms may choose not to lower wages (hire more workers) even when there is excess supply in the
labour market. In our model, there could never be an equilibrium with excess supply. With excess
supply in the rental housing market only a fraction, say 1 − v, of all rental units will be rented.
This reduces the expected revenue per rental unit to (1 − v)R and the supply of rental units will be
decreasing in v. Both market demand and r˜, on the other hand, will be independent of the vacancy
rate, v. Consequently, the representative supplier’s expected profits are strictly decreasing in the
vacancy rate and therefore the supplier will always want to reduce supply so there is no excess supply
in the rental housing market.
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must occur where supply is upward-sloping as shown in Figure 4b.21 In this case, housing suppliers
would like to increase the rental price but are unable to attract any tenants at the higher rent.
Thus, r∗ is a market-clearing equilibrium and we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 2: If demand D(r, µ) and supply n(r, µ) cross when µ = 0 at a point where supply
is upward-sloping, then there is a competitive equilibrium in which the demand for rental housing
exactly equals the supply for rental housing.
***INSERT Figure 4b: Market Clearing Equilibrium HERE ***
Define excess demand as the difference between market demand and market supply for a
given set of parameters, E = D − n. For a stable market-clearing equilibrium, excess demand in
equilibrium must be decreasing in the rental price, i.e. Dr−nr < 0 at r = r∗ and µ = 0. From (8),
market demand is always decreasing in the rental price, and in Proposition 2, we require market
supply to be increasing in r at r = r∗. Therefore, the market-clearing equilibrium is stable.
4. Comparative Statics: Impact of Government Policies
We now examine how changes in government regulations affecting the cost of default, z, and
the quality of housing, h, affect the two different types of equilibria. We begin by considering
the more straightforward comparative statics of the market-clearing equilibrium and then turn to
the comparative statics of the equilibrium with excess demand. For this section, it is useful to
bring back our full notation for demand D(r, µ,x), supply n(r, µ,m), expected revenue per unit
R(r, µ,m), and the expected revenue (per unit) maximizing rental rate r˜(µ,m).
4.1 Market-Clearing Equilibrium
The market-clearing equilibrium condition (20) yields r∗(m) and the equilibrium quantity de-
manded (or, equivalently quantity supplied) will be given by D(r∗(m), 0,x). By totally differenti-
ating these two expressions we obtain Results 1 and 2 (see Appendix for details).
Result 1: The equilibrium rental price which clears the housing market r∗ is increasing in z and
h.
Result 2: The quantity demanded (or quantity supplied) in a market-clearing equilibrium is de-
creasing in z.
These results can also be obtained from considering how changing either the cost of default
21 If the demand curve crosses both the upward and downward-sloping portions of the supply curve
when µ = 0, then the only equilibrium is the market-clearing equilibrium since there will be excess
supply at r˜(0).
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or the quality of housing shifts the demand and supply curves.
4.2 Excess Demand Equilibrium
Suppose now the rental housing market is in an equilibrium with excess demand. It should be
clear from the proof of Proposition 1 that the equilibrium probability, µ˜, that someone looking for
a rental unit does not find one is a function of the exogenous parametersm. Thus, in what follows,
we write µ˜(m) and an excess demand equilibrium is the pair {r˜(µ˜(m),m), µ˜(m)}.
For an excess demand equilibrium to exist, demand and supply must cross at rˇ > r˜(0,m).
The equilibrium with excess demand can be obtained from the following two conditions:
Rr(r˜, µ˜,m) = 0,
(1− µ˜)D(r˜, µ˜,x)− n(r˜, µ˜,m) = 0,
which can be totally differentiated to obtain the following comparative statics result as shown in
the Appendix.
Result 3: The proportion of demand not being filled in any equilibrium with excess demand,
denoted by µ˜, is increasing in both the default cost z and the quality/quantity of housing h.
To provide more intuition, we illustrate Result 3 graphically for the case of a regulated increase
in the supplier’s cost of default z.
Effect of a Change Supplier’s Cost of Default on Excess Demand Equilibrium
Consider Figures 5a and 5b. In both cases, market demand is initially D(r, µ˜0), market sup-
ply is n(r, µ˜0, z0), and the equilibrium with excess demand consists of a rental price r˜(µ˜0, z0),
a proportion of demand not being filled µ˜0, a quantity demanded D(r˜(µ˜0, z0), µ˜0), and a quan-
tity supplied n(r˜(µ˜0, z0), µ˜0, z0), the latter two being consistent with the following expression:
µ˜0 = [D(r˜(µ˜0, z0), µ˜0)− n(r˜(µ˜0, z0), µ˜0, z0)]/D(r˜(µ˜0, z0), µ˜0).22
****** INSERT Figures 5a and 5b: Effect on Equilibrium of a Change in z HERE *****
Suppose now that the government changes housing market regulation so that z increases, from
z0 to z1 > z0. What happens to market demand and supply? Recall, the default cost does not
directly affect the demand for housing.23 Therefore, a change in z has no direct effect on demand
22 We have suppressed the notation for the remaining parameters for exposition purposes.
23 Note however that if z was negative and interpreted as a transfer from the tenant to the landlord,
then demand would be reduced by a smaller z.
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and the demand curve doesn’t shift. Supply, on the other hand, is affected negatively by the
increase in z. It is now more costly to produce housing. Therefore, the supply curve will shift in
to n(r, µ˜0, z1).
At this new supply curve, the rental rate that maximizes expected unit revenue will be lower
and given by r˜(µ˜0, z1).24 At this new rent level, the quantities demanded and supplied are not
consistent with µ˜0:
µ˜0 <
D(r˜(µ˜0, z1), µ˜0)− n(r˜(µ˜0, z1), µ˜0, z1)
D(r˜(µ˜0, z1), µ˜0)
It follows that µ˜ must increase to re-establish equilibrium given Assumption 2 (r˜µ > 0).25 An
increase in µ pushes outward the supply curve (nµ > 0) while the demand curve shifts down
(Dµ < 0). The new equilibrium therefore entails a larger level of µ, denoted by µ˜1.
In this equilibrium, market demand is D(r, µ˜1), market supply is n(r, µ˜1, z1), the equilibrium
price is r˜(µ˜1, z1), the quantity demanded is D˜1 = D(r˜(µ˜1, z1), µ˜1), and the quantity supplied is
n˜1 = n(r˜(µ˜1, z1), µ˜1, z1), with the latter two being consistent with the equilibrium level of excess
demand: µ˜1 = (D˜1 − n˜1)/n˜1. The actual change in the equilibrium values of the rental rate,
quantity demanded and quantity supplied will depend on the relative shifts of the demand and
supply curves. The curves in Figure 5a are drawn such that an increase in z induces a decrease in
the equilibrium rental rate, a decrease in quantity demanded and an increase in quantity supplied.
In Figure 5b, the curves are drawn such that an increase in z induces an increase in the equilibrium
rental rate, and a reduction in both quantity demanded and quantity supplied.
Although we obtain unambiguous comparative statics on the equilibrium value of the proba-
bility of not finding rental housing (Result 3), the effect of changes in policies on the equilibrium
value of the rental rate, excess demand, quantity demanded and housing supply are all ambiguous.
Figure 5 illustrates just two possible cases that can occur when there is an increase in the cost
of default. To fully characterize all the possible cases, we can totally differentiate the equilibrium
rental rate r˜, quantity demanded D˜ and quantity supplied n˜ with respect to z.
dr˜
dz
= r˜µ
dµ˜
dz
+ r˜z,
dn˜
dz
= nr
dr˜
dz
+ nµ
dµ˜
dz
+ nz,
dD˜
dz
= Dr
dr˜
dz
+Dµ
dµ˜
dz
The last terms in the first two expressions are the direct negative effect of a change in z on r˜ and
n˜ (since r˜z < 0 and n˜z < 0). There is no direct effect of z on demand. A change in z also increases
µ˜ (by Result 3) which has a positive indirect effect on both r˜ and n˜ (since nµ > 0 and r˜µ > 0
by assumption) and a negative indirect effect on demand (since Dµ < 0). A change in z has an
ambiguous effect on these equilibrium values. We can say, however, that if r˜ is increasing in z, then
24 This follows from totally differentiating (14) to obtain r˜z = pir/Rrr < 0 given the assumption that
Rrr < 0.
25 Having r˜µ > 0 implies the (D − n)/D is decreasing in µ as stated in the proof of Proposition 1.
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equilibrium demand must be decreasing in z. Equilibrium supply, however, could be increasing or
decreasing. In addition, we note that by definition µ˜ = (D˜ − n˜)/D˜. Totally differentiating this
condition with respect to z and re-writing, we have in equilibrium
dD˜
dz
z
D˜
− dn˜
dz
z
n˜
=
dµ˜
dz
D˜
n˜
z > 0
The elasticity of equilibrium quantity demanded with respect to z will be greater than the elasticity
of equilibrium quantity supplied with respect to z which rules out the possibility of quantity
demanded going down and quantity supplied going up in response to an increase in z. Taken
together then, we have the following four possible cases when the default cost z increases:
i.) µ˜ ↑, r˜ ↓, n˜ ↓, D˜ ↓ (drawn in Figure 5a)
ii.) µ˜ ↑, r˜ ↓, n˜ ↓, D˜ ↑
iii.) µ˜ ↑, r˜ ↓, n˜ ↑, D˜ ↑
iv.) µ˜ ↑, r˜ ↑, n˜ ↓, D˜ ↓ (drawn in Figure 5b)
It is also worth pointing out that excess demand in equilibrium E = D˜− n˜ could be increasing
or decreasing in z when quantity demanded and quantity supplied move in the same direction. In
the case when D˜ goes up and n˜ goes down then excess demand will be larger.
We can conduct a similar graphical exercise for a regulated change in the quality of housing.26
This exercise is available upon request. Note that to further illustrate these comparative statics,
we consider changes in the values of z and h in a numerical example in Section 6. But first we
consider social welfare in this economy.
5. Social Welfare
We are interested in determining how changes in policies affects social welfare in the different types
of equilibria. The direct utilitarian social welfare function is given by the following expression:
W (r, µ,m) = U(r, µ,x) + βΠ(r, µ,m) (21)
where
U(r, µ,x) =
∫ yˆ
y
(u(ho) + y)dG+
∫ y
yˆ
(1− µ) [F (sˆ)u(ho) + (1− F (sˆ))(u(h)− r)] dG
+
∫ y
yˆ
[µu(ho) + y − k] dG
(22)
26 We can also consider the impact of rent control. By definition, rent control reduces the rental price
and increases excess demand under both types of equilibria. It is possible, however, that the supply
of rental housing could go up with the imposition of a rental ceiling unlike the standard analysis of
rent control. The reason is that tenants may default on their rent in this model. The lower rental
rate reduces the aggregate probability of default for a given set of tenants.
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is consumer welfare and β > 0 is the weight on expected maximized profits which are given by
Π(r, µ,m) = n(r, µ,m)R(r, µ,m)− hC(n(r, µ,m)). (23)
How would a change in the rental price and the probability of not finding a house affect social
welfare? First note that by the definition of yˆ given by (5), the change in consumer welfare with
respect to yˆ is equal to zero. That is,
∂U
∂yˆ
= −
[
(1− µ)
(
1− F
(
co + r
yˆ
))
[u(h)− r − u(ho)]− k
]
g(yˆ) = 0.
Consider now the partial effect of a change in the rental price r and the probability of not
finding rental housing µ. We have
∂W (r, µ,m)
∂r
= −(1− µ)
∫ y
yˆ
[(1− F (sˆ)) + f(sˆ)(1/y)(u(h)− r − u(ho))] dG+ β
dΠ
dr
(24)
where by (17) and (23) dΠ/dr = nRr >< 0 and
∂W (r, µ,m)
∂µ = −
∫ y
yˆ
(1− F (sˆ)) [u(h)− r − u(ho)] dG+ β
dΠ
dµ
(25)
where by (17) and (23) dΠ/dµ = nRµ > 0.
The first terms in (24) and (25) are both negative for any µ ∈ [0, 1). An increase in either the
rental price or probability of not finding a rental unit reduces the sum of consumers’ (expected)
utilities. With excess demand, the rental price is r˜. By definition Rr = 0 at r˜ so social welfare is
higher the lower the equilibrium rental rate when there is excess demand in the rental market. How
social welfare is affected by a change in µ, however, is ambiguous since an increase in µ increases
expected maximized profits. With market-clearing equilibrium, µ = 0. The rental price is r∗ and
by Proposition 2, Rr > 0 at r∗ so the second term in (24) is positive and the net effect on social
welfare of an increase in the equilibrium rental rate is ambiguous.
We can also derive the direct effect of policies on social welfare.
∂W
∂h =
∫ y
yˆ
(1− F (sˆ))u′(h) + βnRh − C(n) (26)
∂W
∂z
= βnRz < 0 (27)
In (26), an increase in h has opposite effects on the sum of consumer’s (expected) utilities
and maximized expected profits (using (13)). An increase in z, however, has an unambiguously
negative direct effect on social welfare since z does not affect the consumer’s expected utility and
has a negative effect on the supplier’s expected profits.
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Given the above analysis, it is clear that we will be unable to say anything conclusive about
the total welfare effects of a change in policies when the economy is in an equilibrium with excess
demand. Therefore, we rely on numerical examples to illustrate these comparative statics.
6. Numerical Example
We construct a numerical example to confirm that an excess demand equilibrium can be obtained
in a competitive economy and further to illustrate the impact government policies on the rental
housing market and on social welfare.
We consider a very simple economy of the type described in previous sections. The following
specific functional forms are assumed:
 The total number of individuals in the economy is one;
 The utility of housing is given by u(h) = 2αh;
 The distribution of income is uniform on the interval [y, y];
 The distribution of shocks is uniform on the interval [s, s];
 The cost of producing n housing units of quality h is hn2/2.
Further, the initial parameters are set as follows: y = 2; y = 4; s = 0.8; s = 1.2; co = 0.5; k = 0.5;
h = 2; ho = 0; z = 0.1. Since individuals may demand only one unit of housing, total supply
(denoted S) and demand (denoted D) are numbers lying within the unit interval. In what follows,
U denotes expected consumer welfare, Π denotes expected profits, and W = U +Π denotes total
expected welfare (there is a unit weight β on profits). Also, excess demand is denoted E [with
E = D−S] and the amount of homelessness is denotedM [withM = (1−D)+D(µ+(1−µ)pi)]. To
generate the different types of equilibria, we change the value of the demand parameter α. When
α = 2.25, an excess demand equilibrium obtains, while when α = 1.25, the unique equilibrium is
of the market-clearing type.
In Table 1, we report the values of several variables in the excess demand equilibrium (EDE)
and the values of those variables in the market-clearing allocation (MCA). This allocation is not
an equilibrium since rˇ > r˜(0) (as shown in Figure 4a) but serves as a useful benchmark as this is
the allocation deemed to be an equilibrium if one fails to recognize the possibility of an equilibrium
with excess demand. We also report the values of the various variables in the market-clearing
equilibrium (MCE).
One of the main message of this paper is that excess demand, i.e. a lack of access to affordable
housing, can be an equilibrium phenomenon in the housing market. Table 1 makes clear that such
an equilibrium can exist. Indeed, the EDE is characterized by a rate of excess demand (µ) of
8.1%. Of course, there is no excess demand in either the MCA or the MCE. Some other interesting
features can be noted.
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 As predicted by our theoretical model, the equilibrium rental rate is lower in the EDE than
in the MCA.
 Equilibrium demand and supply (equal to served demand [(1− µ)D]) are larger in the EDE
than in the MCA (despite µ > 0 in the EDE).
 The probability of default and the amount of homelessness are lower in the EDE than in the
MCA.
 Profits are larger in the EDE than in the MCA. This, of course, is due to the lower probability
of default in the EDE which translates into a larger R (not reported).
 Consumer welfare, profits and therefore total welfare are larger in the EDE than in the MCA.
Table 1
Benchmark: MCA, EDE, and MCE
µ r† D S E pi M U Π W
α = 2.25
MCA 0 2.113 0.884 0.884 0 0.155 0.253 7.697 0.781 8.478
EDE 0.081 1.899 0.973 0.894 0.079 0.055 0.155 8.509 0.799 9.309
α = 1.25
MCE 0 1.945 0.922 0.922 0 0.049 0.123 5.217 0.850 6.068
†: For the MCA, the reported r is rˇ, for the EDE, it is r˜, and for the MCE, it is r∗.
Note that we have performed several examples using different values for the parameters and that
these results are robust. It follows from those facts that the EDE dominates in virtually all respect
the MCA.27
In Table 2, we report comparative static results for an economy initially resting in one or
the other allocation described in Table 1. Thus, Table 2 indicates the direction of the change in
a variable from its original value in Table 1. The first remarkable result that obtains is that an
increase in housing quality h, observed in the 1980s and the 1990s when more stringent regulation
of the housing construction industry was enacted by governments (Quigley and Raphael, 2004),
could have exacerbated the problem of access to affordable housing. Indeed, in our numerical
example, an increase in h translates into an increase in homelessness. This is true whether the
economy rests in an EDE or a MCE.
However, the second remarkable result that obtains is that the impact of a regulation induced
27 Note that we cannot make any statements regarding how the EDE compares with the MCE since
these equilibria arise under different values for the demand parameter α.
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change in z or h is generally different in the EDE as compared to either the MCA of the MCE. For
example, whether the change is in z or h, the rental rate moves in opposite directions. The same
is true for the impact on demand, supply, the probability of default, consumer welfare and total
welfare. It follows from these facts that in choosing housing policies, it is well-advised to understand
that their impact in an EDE may substantially differ from that in a MCE. To illustrate this last
fact, consider the impact of an increase z achieved, for example, by an increase in the protection of
tenants from eviction and often observed in practice (e.g. by imposing a delay before a tenant can
be evicted, or by forbidding eviction in the winter). The standard analysis performed by analyzing
the market clearing equilibrium suggests that increasing z is very much counter-productive for the
tenants as they would then face a higher rent, a higher probability of default and a higher rate of
homelessness, and generally, a lower level of welfare. On the contrary, an analysis of this policy in
the excess demand equilibrium characterized in this paper points to a number of improvements for
the tenants. Indeed, increasing the protection of tenants from eviction lowers the equilibrium rent,
probability of default, and amount of homelessness and ultimately increases the level of welfare.
Table 2
Impact of a 10% regulated increase in h and z, relative to the benchmark in Table 1 §
Variable µ r† D S E pi M U Π W
h (2 → 2.2)
MCA (α = 2.25) n/a + — — n/a + + — — —
EDE (α = 2.25) + — + — + — + + — +
MCE (α = 1.25) n/a + — — n/a + + — — —
z (0.1 → 0.11)
MCA (α = 2.25) n/a + — — n/a + + — — —
EDE (α = 2.25) + — + — + — — + — +
MCE (α = 1.25) n/a + — — n/a + + — — —
§: A “+” indicates an increase in the variable while a “—” indicates a decrease (relative to the initial values in the
benchmark).
†: For the MCA, the reported r is rˇ, for the EDE, it is r˜, and for the MCE, it is r∗.
The case of a regulation induced increase in housing quality h is rather similar. Recall that
an increase in h translates into a higher utility for a tenant given he consumes a housing unit.
An increase in h also translates into higher construction costs on the supply side (recall the cost
function is hn2/2). Again, in a market clearing equilibrium, an increase in h translates into a
general deterioration of the housing market and a lower level of welfare for the tenants. And
again, the conclusion is completely reversed if instead, the economy rests in an excess demand
equilibrium. In this case, an increase in housing quality leads to an improvement in the market
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and more generally, to a higher level of welfare for the tenants.
Given the possibility that actual housing markets may be resting in excess demand equilibria, it
follows from these observations that standard real world policy prescriptions should be thoroughly
re-examined.
7. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that if there is a possibility that tenants default on their rent, then a competitive
market equilibrium could exhibit excess demand without any market interventions, i.e., rent con-
trol. We demonstrated both algebraically and with numerical examples that whether or not there
is excess demand in the rental market has implications for housing policies. There are several hous-
ing policies we did not consider, such as the provision of public housing, rental housing insurance,
and rent allowances. Some of these policies would require financing. We leave these investigations
for future research.
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Appendix
Section 2.1: Comparative Statics of Market Demand
To determine how market demand changes with the various parameters, we can differentiate vh−vo
given by the expression on the left-hand side of (5) with respect to the various parameters. Doing
this, we obtain
∂(vh − vo)
∂r = −(1− µ)[u(h)− r − u(ho)]f(sˆ)
1
y − (1− µ)[1− F (sˆ)] < 0,
∂(vh − vo)
∂µ = −[1− F (sˆ)][u(h)− r − u(ho)] < 0,
∂(vh − vo)
∂co
= −(1− µ)[u(h)− r − u(ho)]f(sˆ)
1
y
< 0,
∂(vh − vo)
∂k
= −1 < 0, ∂(vh − vo)
∂h
= (1− µ)[1− F (sˆ)]u′(h) > 0.
Using the above and (6), we obtain the following partial derivatives for yˆ(r, µ, co, k, h)
yˆr =
1
sˆ +
1− F (sˆ)
[u(h)− r − u(ho)]f(sˆ)(sˆ/y)
> 0, yˆµ =
1− F (sˆ)
(1− µ)f(sˆ)(sˆ/y) > 0, yˆco =
1
sˆ > 0,
yˆk =
1
(1− µ)[u(h)− r − u(ho)]f(sˆ)(sˆ/y)
> 0, yˆh = −
[1− F (sˆ)]u′(h)
[u(h)− r − u(ho)]f(sˆ)(sˆ/y)
< 0
which yields (7). Then, from the definition of market demand D = 1−G(yˆ) it follows that
Dr = −g(yˆ)yˆr < 0, Dµ = −g(yˆ)yˆµ < 0,
Dco = −g(yˆ)yˆco < 0, Dk = −g(yˆ)yˆk < 0, Dh = −g(yˆ)yˆh > 0
which yields (8).
Section 2.2: Comparative Statics of Market Supply
To determine how market supply changes with the various parameters, we first differentiate the
supplier’s expected revenue per rental unit given by (12). Doing this, we obtain
Rr = (1− pi)− (r + z)pir><0, Rµ = −(r + z)piµ > 0,
Rco = −(r + z)pico < 0, Rk = −(r + z)pik > 0,
Rh = −(r + z)pih < 0, Rz = −pi < 0
which yields (13). For later use, we also determine how r˜ changes with the exogenous parameters
by totally differentiating (14) to obtain:
r˜µ = −
Rrµ
Rrr
r˜z =
pir
Rrr
< 0, r˜co = −
Rrco
Rrr
, r˜k = −
Rrk
Rrr
, r˜h = −
Rrh
Rrr
23
where Rrj = −pij − (r+ z)pirj for j = µ, co, k, h and it is assumed that Rrr < 0. Totally differenti-
ating (17) to obtain
nr =
Rr
hC ′′(n) , nz =
Rz
hC ′′(n) < 0
nµ =
Rµ
hC ′′(n) > 0, nco =
Rco
hC ′′(n) < 0
nk =
Rk
hC ′′(n)
> 0, nh =
Rh − C ′(n)
hC ′′(n)
< 0
which yields (18).
Section 3: Derivation of Results 1 and 2
Result 1: Totally differentiating the equilibrium condition (20), using (8) and (18) and the stability
condition Dr − nr < 0 at r = r∗ to obtain
rz∗ =
nz
Dr − nr
> 0, rco∗ =
−Dco + nco
Dr − nr
,
rk∗ =
−Dk + nk
Dr − nr
< 0, rh∗ =
−Dh + nh
Dr − nr
> 0
which yields Result 1.
Result 2: Totally differentiating D∗ = D(r∗(z, co, k, h), 0, co, k, h) with respect to z, k, co, and h to
obtain
dD∗
dz = Drrz
∗ < 0
dD∗
dco
= Drrco∗ +Dco =
−Dconr + ncoDr
Dr − nr
dD∗
dk
= Drrk∗ +Dk =
−Dknr + nkDr
Dr − nr
dD∗
dh
= Drrh∗ +Dh =
−Dhnr + nhDr
Dr − nr
where the expressions for the partials of r∗ have been substituted in. Given (8) and (18), we have
Result 2.
Section 3: Derivation of Result 3
We first state and prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 1: If Rrµ > 0, then Rrk > 0 and Rrh < 0.
In what follows, we focus, without loss of generality, on the case in which the effect on the
average probability of default dominates the effect on the marginal probability of a change in µ,
i.e., Rrµ > 0 or r˜µ > 0. By Lemma 1, we can then sign Rrk (and r˜k) and Rrh (and r˜h). The sign
of Rrco , however, remains ambiguous.
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Proof of Lemma 1:
From (14), we have
Rrµ = −piµ − (r + z)pirµ, Rrk = −pik − (r + z)pirk, Rrh = −pih − (r + z)pirh
Recall, the following
piµ = Byˆµ < 0, pik = Byˆk < 0, pih = Byˆh > 0
where
B(co, r, yˆ) =
g(yˆ)
[1−G(yˆ)]2
[∫ y
yˆ
F
(
co + r
y
)
dG− F
(
co + r
yˆ
)
(1−G(yˆ))
]
< 0
and yˆ(r, µ, co, k, h) with yˆµ > 0, yˆk > 0 and yˆh < 0.
Given the order of differentiation is irrelevant for cross-partials, we have that
pirµ = piµr =
dB
dr
yˆµ +Byˆµr, pirk = pikr =
dB
dr
yˆk + Byˆkr, pirh = pihr =
dB
dr
yˆh +Byˆhr
We can write the expression for yˆr as follows:
yˆr ≡ Y (h, r, sˆ, yˆ) =
1
sˆ
+
H (sˆ)
sˆ
1
u(h)− r − u(ho)
yˆ
where H(sˆ) = (1−F (s))/f(s), sˆ = (co+r)/y and yˆ(r, µ, co, k, h). We do not make any assumptions
on the sign of H ′(s). Differentiating Y , we obtain
Yh = −
H (sˆ)
sˆ
u′(h)
[u(h)− r − u(ho)]2
< 0
Yr =
H (sˆ)
sˆ
1
[u(h)− r − u(ho)]2
> 0
Ysˆ = −
1
sˆ
+
H ′(sˆ)
sˆ
1
u(h)− r − u(ho)
− H(sˆ)
sˆ2
1
u(h)− r − u(ho)
Yyˆ =
H (sˆ)
sˆ
1
u(h)− r − u(ho)
> 0
We can then determine the following second partial derivatives:
yˆrµ = yˆµr = (Ysˆsˆy + Yyˆ) yˆµ
yˆrk = yˆkr = (Ysˆsˆy + Yyˆ) yˆk
yˆrh = yˆhr = (Ysˆsˆy + Yyˆ) yˆh + Yh
Using the above, we have
piµ + (r + z)pirµ = Byˆµ + (r + z)
(
dB
dr
yˆµ +Byˆµr
)
= yˆµ
[
B + (r + z)
(
dB
dr +B
yˆrµ
yˆµ
)]
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pik + (r + z)pirk = Byˆk + (r + z)
(
dB
dr
yˆk +Byˆkr
)
= yˆk
[
B + (r + z)
(
dB
dr
+B yˆrk
yˆk
)]
pih + (r + z)pirh = Byˆh + (r + z)
(
dB
dr yˆh +Byˆhr
)
= yˆh
[
B + (r + z)
(
dB
dr
+B yˆrh
yˆh
)]
= yˆh
[
B + (r + z)
(
dB
dr
+B (Ysˆsˆy + Yyˆ + Yh/yˆh)
)]
= yˆh
[
B + (r + z)
(
dB
dr
+B (Ysˆsˆy + Yyˆ)
)]
+ (r + z)BYh
Since yˆrµ/yˆµ = yˆrk/yˆk, yˆµ > 0 and yˆk > 0, it follows that piµ + (r + z)pirµ < 0 if and only if
pik + (r + z)pirk < 0. Given yˆµ > 0 and yˆh < 0, the condition piµ + (r + z)pirµ < 0 implies that
pih + (r + z)pirh > 0. Therefore, we have Lemma 1.
Result 3:
The equilibrium with excess demand can be represented by the following two conditions:
Rr(r, µ, z, co, k, h) = 0
(1− µ)D(r, µ, co, k, h)− n(r, z, µ, co, k, h) = 0
Together, the above conditions yield rˆ and µˆ as functions of (z, co, k, h).
Totally differentiating the system of equations yields
[
Rrr Rrµ
(1− µ)Dr −D + (1− µ)Dµ − nµ
] [
drˆ
dµˆ
]
=
[
−Rrz −Rrco −Rrk −Rrh
nz −(1− µ)Dco + nco −(1− µ)Dk + nk −(1− µ)Dh + nh
]


dz
dco
dk
dh


Applying Cramer’s Rule and using (8) and (18) as well as well as Lemma 1, we obtain the following
total partial derivatives
dµˆ
dz =
nzRrr +Rrz(1− µ)Dr
Det > 0
dµˆ
dk
=
−((1− µ)Dk − nk)Rrr +Rrk(1− µ)Dr
Det
< 0
dµˆ
dh =
−((1− µ)Dh − nh)Rrr +Rrh(1− µ)Dr
Det > 0
where
Det = Rrr(−D + (1− µ)Dµ)− Rrµ(1− µ)Dr > 0
which proves Result 3. Note, in equilibrium µˆ = µ˜ as defined in Section 3.
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rRental Units
Figure 1: Market Demand for µ = 0 and µ > 0
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Figure 2: Expected Revenue Per Rental Unit, r˜µ > 0
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rRental Units
Figure 3: Market Supply for µ = 0 and µ > 0, r˜µ > 0
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rRental Units
Figure 4a: Excess Demand Equilibrium
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Rental Units
Figure 4b: Market-Clearing Equilibrium
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rRental Units
Figure 5a: Comparative Static, Changes in z, Case where r˜ decreases
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Figure 5b: Comparative Static, Changes in z, Case where r˜ increases
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